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We derive a bound for the security of QKD with finite resources under one-way post-processing,
based on a definition of security that is composable and has an operational meaning. While our
proof relies on the assumption of collective attacks, unconditional security follows immediately for
standard protocols like Bennett-Brassard 1984 and six-states. For single-qubit implementations of
such protocols, we find that the secret key rate becomes positive when at least N ∼ 105 signals
are exchanged and processed. For any other discrete-variable protocol, unconditional security can
be obtained using the exponential de Finetti theorem, but the additional overhead leads to very
pessimistic estimates.
Introduction. Quantum cryptography, or more exactly
quantum key distribution (QKD), allows to distribute a
secure key between two authorized partners, Alice and
Bob, connected by a quantum channel and a public au-
thenticated classical channel [1, 2, 3]. First proposed in
1984 by Bennett and Brassard (BB84, [4]) and in 1991
by Ekert [5], QKD is the first offspring of quantum infor-
mation science to reach the level of applied physics and
even commercial products. On the theoretical side, much
effort has been devoted to derive rigorous bounds for se-
curity. However, almost all the available security bounds
hold true only if infinitely long keys are produced and
processed. In contrast, a practical QKD scheme can only
use finite resources — for instance, Alice and Bob have
limited computational power, and they can only commu-
nicate a finite number of (qu)bits, resulting in keys of
finite length.
The security of finite-length keys has been studied first
in [6] and later in [7, 8] for the BB84 protocol, as well
as in [9] for a larger class of protocols. The applicability
of these results is, however, limited: Ref. [9] considers
only a restricted class of attacks; in Refs [6, 7, 8], the un-
derlying notion of security is not composable [10], which
means that the generated keys are not secure enough to
be used in applications, e.g., for encryption (more be-
low). A more recent work [11], which focuses on a prac-
tical implementation of BB84 and has already been used
in an experiment [12], uses a definition of security which
is probably composable, although the issue is not dis-
cussed. In this Letter, we provide a security bound for
discrete-variable QKD protocols with finite resources and
with respect to a composable security definition, based on
the formalism developed by one of us [13]. As first case
studies, we apply it to BB84 and to the six-states proto-
col [14, 15] when implemented with single qubits.
Definition of security. In the existing literature on
QKD, not only the analysis, but also the very defini-
tion of security is mostly limited to the asymptotic case;
and we therefore need to revisit it here. Most gener-
ally, the security of a key K can be parametrized by its
deviation ε from a perfect key, which is defined as a uni-
formly distributed bit string whose value is completely
independent of the adversary’s knowledge. In an asymp-
totic scenario, a key K of length ℓ is commonly said to be
secure if this deviation ε tends to zero as ℓ increases. In
the non-asymptotic scenario studied here, however, the
deviation ε is always finite. This makes it necessary to
attribute an operational interpretation to the parameter
ε. Only then it is possible to choose a meaningful secu-
rity threshold (i.e., an upper bound for ε) reflecting the
level of security we are aiming at. Another practically
relevant requirement that we need to take into account
is composability of the security definition. Composability
guarantees that a key generated by a QKD protocol can
safely be used in applications, e.g., as a one-time-pad for
message encryption. Although this requirement is obvi-
ously crucial for practice, it is not met by most security
definitions considered in the literature [10].
In contrast to that, the results derived in this Letter
are formulated in terms of a security definition that meets
both requirements, i.e., it is composable and, in addition,
the parameter ε has an operational interpretation. The
definition we use was proposed in [16, 17]: for any ε ≥ 0,
a keyK is said to be ε-secure with respect to an adversary
E if the joint state ρKE satisfies
1
2
∥∥ρKE − τK ⊗ ρE∥∥1 ≤ ε , (1)
where τK is the completely mixed state on K. The pa-
rameter ε can be seen as the maximum probability that
K differs from a perfect key (i.e., a fully random bit
string) [16]. Equivalently, ε can be interpreted as the
maximum failure probability, where failure means that
“something went wrong”, e.g., that an adversary might
have gained some information on K. From this perspec-
tive, it is also easy to understand why the definition is
composable. In fact, the failure probability of any cryp-
tosystem that uses a perfect secret key only increases by
2(at most) ε if the perfect key is replaced by an ε-secure
key. In particular, because one-time pad encryption with
a perfect key has failure probability 0 (the ciphertext
gives zero information about the message), it follows that
one-time-pad encryption based on an ε-secure key re-
mains perfectly confidential, except with probability at
most ε.
Protocol. A QKD protocol starts with the distribu-
tion of quantum signals. In this Letter, we take an
entanglement-based view, that is, after this distribution
step, Alice and Bob share N (entangled) particle pairs,
whose joint state we denote by ρANBN . Next, Alice and
Bob apply individual measurements to their particles to
get classical data. For definiteness, we focus on protocols
that use two-dimensional quantum systems (qubits) and
von Neumann measurements, resulting in N correlated
pairs of bits. Then, in a parameter estimation step, Alice
and Bob reveal a random sample consisting of m of these
pairs (using a public communication channel) which al-
lows them to estimate the statistics λ(a,b) of their data,
i.e., the relative frequency of the symbols. The protocol
may also specify a sifting phase, in which some items are
discarded.
At this stage, both Alice and Bob hold a string of
n ≤ N − m bits, called raw key, denoted by Xn and
Y n, respectively. These raw keys are generally only par-
tially correlated and only partially secret. But—and this
is where quantum physics plays a role—the maximum in-
formation that an eavesdropper Eve might have gained
during the protocol, in the following denoted En, can be
computed solely from the statistics λ(a,b). This allows
Alice and Bob to transform the raw key pair into a fully
secure key K of length ℓ ≤ n, using some purely classical
procedure, in the following called post-processing. In this
Letter, we focus on one-way post-processing consisting
of two steps, called error correction (also known as in-
formation reconciliation) and privacy amplification. For
the error correction, Alice sends some information on her
raw key Xn over the public channel, allowing Bob, who
already knows Y n, to compute a guess for Xn. Finally,
privacy amplification is applied to turn Xn into a fully
secure key K. This is typically done by two-universal
hashing [24].
Asymptotic analysis. The one-way protocol described
above has been studied extensively over the past few
years, mostly in an asymptotic scenario where the size
of the raw key tends to infinity. In this case, a commonly
used figure of merit is the sifted key rate r′, defined as
the ratio r′ := limn→∞
ℓ(n)
n between the number ℓ(n) of
generated key bits and the size n of the raw key. Devetak
and Winter [18] have proved that, under the assumption
of collective attacks (see below),
r′ = H(X |E)−H(X |Y ) , (2)
where H(.|.) is the conditional von Neumann entropy,
evaluated after the sifting step—note that, when both
systems are classical as in H(X |Y ), von Neumann en-
tropy becomes Shannon entropy. The expression says
that the sifted key rate r′ is equal to the uncertainty
that Eve has on the raw key bits X , minus Bob’s uncer-
tainty: a very intuitive statement after all. Multiplying
the sifted key rate r′ with the ratio nN of raw key bits
per signal gives the key rate per signal r, which is an
indicator for the asymptotic performance of the overall
protocol. For many schemes, the ratio nN can be chosen
arbitrarily close to one for sufficiently large N , because a
small fraction m << N of signals provides a sufficiently
accurate parameter estimation; in this case, the key rate
per signal r and the sifted key rate r′ are asymptotically
equal.
Non-asymptotic analysis. When the number N of
exchanged quantum signals is finite, the above consid-
erations are no longer sufficient. For example, since
n+m ≤ N , one has to find a trade-off between the length
of the raw key n and the precision of parameter estima-
tion, which depends on the sample size m. Imperfect
parameter estimation is however not the only deviation
from the asymptotic case. The performance of an error
correction procedure EC might — and actually does in
practical realizations — perform worse than the theoret-
ical limit. For our security analysis, the main charac-
teristics of EC are the number of bits that need to be
transmitted over the public channel (carrying informa-
tion on Xn), in the following denoted leakEC, and the
error probability εEC, i.e., the probability that Bob com-
putes a wrong guess for Xn. Finally, as discussed above,
the security of a key generated from finite resources is
always finite: the length of the extractable secret key
depends on the desired security ε of the final key.
Our goal is to find the generalization of (2) for QKD
with finite resources, and to use it to compute r for given
(N, ε, leakEC, εEC) after optimizing over the choices of
other possible parameters. The analysis will be based on
the tools developed in [13]. It particular, it relies on a
generalization of the von Neumann entropy [25], called
smooth min-entropy. For any bipartite density operator
ρAB and ε ≥ 0, the smooth min-entropy H
ε
min(A|B) is
defined as the maximum, taken over all density operators
ρ¯AB that are ε-close to ρAB, of the quantity
Hmin(A|B) := − log2min{λ>0: ∃σB : ρ¯AB ≤ λ idA⊗σB}
where idA denotes the identity operator on subspace A
and σB is any density operator on subspace B. The sig-
nificance of the smooth min-entropy stems from the fact
that it characterizes the number of uniform bits that can
be extracted by privacy amplification.
As a starting point, a formula for the number of final
key bits ℓ can be obtained as a straightforward general-
ization of Lemma 6.4.1 in [13]:
Lemma 1. The key agreement protocol described above
3generates an ε-secure key if, for some ε¯ ≥ 0,
ℓ ≤ H ε¯min(X
n|En)− leakEC − 2 log2
1
2(ε−ε¯−εEC)
. (3)
Lemma 1 shows explicitly the two-step nature of one-
way post-processing: for error correction, Alice has to
send a bit stringC of length leakEC to Bob over the public
channel, hence, reducing Eve’s uncertainty by the same
amount. Privacy amplification then extracts a key whose
length roughly corresponds to Eve’s uncertainty after
error correction, which is given by H ε¯min(X
n|CEn) ≥
H ε¯min(X
n|En)− leakEC [26].
To go further, we have to evaluate the smooth min-
entropy H ε¯min(X
n|En). This evaluation is easy in the
case of collective attacks, i.e., under the assumption that
Alice and Bob (in an entanglement-based view) initially
share a state of the form ρANBN = (σA¯B¯)
⊗N with σA¯B¯
a two-qubit state. Indeed, in this case one can also as-
sume ρXnEn = (σX¯E¯)
⊗n without loss of generality, since
all purifications of ρAB are equivalent under a local uni-
tary operation by Eve, and there exists clearly a purifica-
tion with that property. However, the statistics λ(a,b) ac-
quired during parameter estimation generally only gives a
partial characterization of σX¯E¯ . Lemma 2 below [27] pro-
vides a lower bound on H ε¯min(X
n|En), given that σX¯E¯ is
contained in a set Γ compatible with the statistics λ(a,b),
except with probability ε¯′.
Lemma 2. For any ε¯ > ε¯′, the smooth min-entropy of
the state ρXnEn described above is lower bounded by
H ε¯min(X
n|En) ≥ n
(
min
σX¯E¯∈Γ
H(X¯ |E¯)− δ
)
(4)
where δ := 7
√
log2(2/(ε¯−ε¯
′))
n .
The description of the set of states Γ takes into account
the fact that the parameter estimation has been made
on a sample of finite size m. A quantitative version of
the law of large numbers (see e.g. Theorem 12.2.1 and
Lemma 12.6.1 in [23]) yields the following statement:
Lemma 3. If the statistics λm are obtained by measure-
ments of m samples of σ according to a POVM with d
outcomes then, for any ε¯ ′ > 0, σ is contained in the set
Γξ =
{
σ : ‖λm − λ∞(σ)‖ ≤ ξ :=
√
2 ln(1/ε¯ ′)+d ln(m+1)
m
}
except with probability ε¯ ′, where λ∞(σ) denotes the prob-
ability distribution defined by the POVM applied to σ.
The three Lemmas together yield the desired general-
ization of (2):
r′ = Hξ(X |E)−
(
leakEC +∆
)
/n (5)
with Hξ(X |E) = minσX¯E¯∈Γξ H(X¯|E¯) and ∆ =
2 log2 1/[2(ε− ε¯− εEC)] + 7
√
n log2(2/(ε¯− ε¯
′)). We re-
call that (N, ε, leakEC, εEC) are parameters of the proto-
col implementation, while n, m, ε¯ and ε¯ ′ must be cho-
sen as to maximize r = (n/N)r′ under the constraints
n+m ≤ N and ε− εEC > ε¯ > ε¯
′ ≥ 0.
In general, (5) is valid only for collective attacks be-
cause of the estimate (4) of H ε¯min(X
n|En). However, it
has been proved that the assumption of collective attacks
can be made without loss of generality for the BB84 and
the six-states protocols [19, 20] (see open issues for the
discussion of a more general approach based on the ex-
ponential de Finetti theorem [13, 21]). To illustrate the
bound (5), we move on to derive the explicit expressions
of Hξ(X |E).
BB84. We consider an asymmetric version of BB84
[22]: the key is obtained from measurements in one basis
B0 chosen both by Alice and Bob with probability p0; the
complementary basis B1, chosen with probability p1 =
1−p0 is used for parameter estimation. So n = Np
2
0 and
m = Np 21 , while 2Np0p1 signals are discarded in sifting.
The computation of Hξ(X |E) can be done in full along
the usual lines, see e.g. Appendix A of [3]. More directly,
notice that, in this term, the only finite-key effect is the
imperfection of the statistics. Knowing the asymptotic
value H(X¯ |E¯) = 1 − h(e1) where e1 is the error rate in
the basis B1 (phase error), it is obvious that the worst-
case estimate of λ(a,b) ≡ e1 is e˜1 = e1 + ξ(m, d = 2)
because the POVM has two outcomes (same vs different
bits). Therefore
Hξ(X |E) = 1− h(e˜1) . (6)
Six-states. We consider an asymmetric version of the
six-states protocol: the key is obtained from measure-
ments in one basis B0 chosen both by Alice and Bob
with probability p0; the complementary bases B1 and
B2, chosen with equal probability q =
1−p0
2 , are used
for parameter estimation. Sifting yields n = Np 20 and
m1 = m2 = Nq
2 while the remaining signals are dis-
carded. Similarly as above, the asymptotic formula (for
e1 = e2, a case that minimizes it) can be immediately
translated into
Hξ(X |E) = (1− e˜0)
[
1− h
(
1− e˜1 − e˜0/2
1− e˜0
)]
(7)
with e˜1 = e1 + ξ(m1, d = 2) and e˜0 = e0 + ξ(n, d = 2),
because e0 is estimated on the n bits of the raw key.
Plots. For an a priori estimate of our bounds, we
have supposed as usual that parameter estimation yields
e0 = e1 ≡ Q; imperfect EC has been characterized by
leakEC/n = 1.2h(Q) and εEC = 10
−10 based on the per-
formances of real codes [28]. The optimization was done
numerically; in particular, the optimal value of p1 was
found to be approximately 1nb (N/N0)
−1/4, N0 being the
smallestN such that r > 0 and nb = 2 for BB84 and 3 for
six-states. The results are shown in Fig. 1. The slight
difference between the two protocols is due to the fact
that six-states estimates more parameters than BB84:
the rates are in principle higher because the bound on
Eve’s information is tighter, but, for short keys, more
signals must be devoted to the estimation. These plots
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FIG. 1: (color online) Lower bound for the key rate r as
a function of the number of exchanged quantum signals N ,
for the BB84 (full lines) and the six-states protocol (dashed
lines); values: ε = 10−5, εEC = 10
−10, leakEC/n = 1.2h(Q),
and several Q = e0 = e1.
do not depend very critically on the value ε; in particular,
even for ε ≥ 10−2 our bounds are tighter than those com-
puted in [9] for a limited class of attacks on the six-states
protocol.
Open issues.— We point out two directions for future
work. First: The results we have presented here are not
necessarily tight: better estimates might lead to more
optimistic bounds on the security. Lemmas 1–3 can be
shown to be optimal up to an additive term of the order
log 1/ε. So basically there is room for improvement only
in the performance of error correction schemes. Second:
Formula (5) has been derived under the assumption of
collective attacks and provides full security for the BB84
and the six-states protocols only thanks to specific sym-
metries [19, 20]. To get a fully general statement, one
might invoke a quantum version of de Finetti’s represen-
tation theorem as proposed in [21], which, in the asymp-
totic case, implies that security against general attacks
follows from security against collective attacks. This
technique, however, gives rise to additional deviations
(see Theorem 6.5.1 of [13] for explicit formulae) which
are significant in a non-asymptotic scenario and lead to
very pessimistic bounds. To improve them, a tighter vari-
ant of de Finetti’s theorem, or some new ideas, might be
required.
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